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Copyright Protection for Compilations of Fact: Does the
Originality Standard Allow Protection on the Basis of
Industrious Collection?*
Federal law provides copyright protection for "original works of au-
thorship,"' including "compilations and derivative works." Protection
"extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as
distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work. ' 2
While courts and commentators3 have discussed the threshold level of
originality an author 4 must contribute to a work in order to receive copy-
right protection when compiling or arranging factual data,5 no clear stan-
dards have emerged. As the Supreme Court recently acknowledged, the
law is unsettled regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements
combine with an author's original contributions to form protected
expression. 6
A split of opinion has emerged in the lower courts between those
protecting "industrious collection" and those requiring some higher
level of originality in compilations of noncopyrightable material. The in-
dustrious collection doctrine provides that the amount of labor involved
in compiling factual materials entitles a work to copyright protection; an
analysis of the level of original authorship involved is not necessary.7
The Eighth Circuit, implicitly applying the doctrine, recently gave pro-
tection to page numbers taken from materials arranged in a logical, uno-
* This Note received first prize in the Notre Dame Law School portion of the Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition.
1 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
2 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1982).
3 Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theoy for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 516 (1981); Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright, 39 B.U.L. REv. 426 (1959);
Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76 HAIv. L. REv. 1569 (1963);
Patry, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Reply, 6 CoM. & L. I 1 (October 1984); Note, Copyrighted Compi-
lations of Public Domain Facts in a Directory: The Criterion of Infringement, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 833 (1977).
4 The term "author" is used loosely to include the broad spectrum of compilers or arrangers of
factual data, some of whom actually produce no original product. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (the constitutional definition of "author" is "he to whom anything
owes its origin; originator;, maker"); 1 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.06[A] (1986) ("[T]he one indis-
pensible element of authorship is originality. One who has slavishly or mechanically copied from
others may not claim to be an author."); Patry, supra note 3, at 18 (quoting NiMMER, supra, § 2.01 [A])
("It was reasoned that since an author is 'the beginner.., or first mover of anything .... creator,
originator,' it follows that a work is not the product of an author unless the work is original."). Patry
points out, however, that this reasoning is faulty because "it begs the central question of defining
originality in works that admittedly are comprised of elements of which the 'author' was not the
creator or originator," i.e. compilations of fact. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
5 Facts themselves are not subject to copyright protection. See Miller v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (5th Cir. 1981) (and cases cited therein); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
6 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985).
7 See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's Circular
Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
See also infra notes 59-105 and accompanying text.
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riginal manner.8 Courts have thus pushed the originality threshold to its
outer limit. This labor theory has been criticized as granting copyright
protection to labor qua labor, without requiring original creative
thought, in violation of the Constitution and the Copyright Act. 9
Part I of this note describes the constitutional and statutory copy-
right provisions with an eye toward determining the drafters' intent re-
garding the level of originality required for copyright protection. Part II
provides an overview of how the courts have defined originality. Part III
analyzes the industrious collection doctrine. Part IV asserts that the in-
dustrious collection doctrine allows courts to lower the originality
threshold below the level intended under the Constitution, the Copy-
right Act, and the case law, thus limiting public use of information and
overlooking the principle that the law grants the copyright monopoly
only to original works that reflect the author's personality.
I. Basic Concepts of Originality
A. The Copyright Clause
The framers of the Constitution provided that Congress shall have
the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 10 While on its face the Con-
stitution says nothing about originality as a prerequisite for copyright
protection, the words imply such a requirement. By granting an exclu-
sive right to "authors," the clause implies that originality is the essence
of the right to protection." The reference to "progress" suggests that a
work entitled to copyright protection contain more than merely trivial
originality.' 2 But the clause is so general that, other than implying that
some originality must indeed play a role, it offers little help in determin-
ing the minimum original contribution necessary to create a protected
work from factual data.
Because no extensive history of the copyright clause exists,13 difficul-
ties abound in determining exactly what types of works the framers in-
tended copyright protection to cover. They appear to have primarily
intended to promote learning followed by a secondary concern for pro-
tecting authors and providing them with incentive.' 4 These concerns do
8 West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. dnied, 107
S. Ct. 962 (1987). See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
9 See Patry, supra note 3, at 27.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
11 E.g., NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.06[A].
12 Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945); NIMMER, supra note 4, § 1.93[B).
See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
13 See, e.g., STUDIES ON COPYIGHT, No. 3, THE MEANING OF "WRITINGS" IN THE COPYRIGHT
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTtrUToN 70 (1963) [hereinafter STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT] (the committee pro-
ceedings at the Constitutional Convention were conducted secretly and the final form of the clause
was approved without debate). Cf L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 193
(1968).
14 See, e.g., L. PATrERSON, supra note 13, at 193 (proposals submitted by James Madison and
Charles Pinckney "manifest an interest in having the federal government promote knowledge" and
indicate that copyright was to be statutory protection for a recognized right). Madison made this
point clear in THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961):
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not imply any limitation on the scope of the clause, but rather intimate
that the types of works protected will expand when courts see a new type
of authorship that needs protecting. 15 It is clear, however, that the fram-
ers intended to make some level of originality inherent in any expansion
of protected expression. While courts may extend constitutional protec-
tion to factual works, they must not extend that protection to works with-
out the requisite level of originality.
B. The Copyright Act
Congress substantially revised copyright law in 1976 for the first
time since 1909.16 Section 102 is the cornerstone of the Copyright Act:
"(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this tide, in origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
.... "17 The originality requirement is explicit, but one looks in vain for
its definition. The phrase "original works of authorship" was purposely
left undefined for courts to incorporate the necessary standard of origi-
nality.' 8 Congress recognized that new forms of expression are continu-
ally evolving. It did not intend "to freeze the scope of copyrightable
subject matter at the present stage of communications technology or to
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right to useful inven-
tions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides
in both cases with the claims of individuals.
See also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' "); Gorman, supra note 3, at 1569 ("the author's interest
thus is protected as a means of advancing the interest of society").
15 See STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 13, at 70.
16 The first Congress enacted the first copyright law in 1790 and comprehensive revisions oc-
curred in 1831, 1870, and 1909. After 1900, numerous technological advances occurred that im-
pacted copyright law such as motion pictures and sound recordings. Between 1924 and 1940
legislators intoduced several revision measures which failed to become law. In 1955, the movement
for copyright law revision was revived and a period of comprehensive research and study by the
copyright office ensued. A draft bill eventually took shape and was introduced in both houses in
1964. Congress promulgated numerous revisions and held hearings over the next decade that saw
the rise of the computer revolution and the advent of cable television. The revised bill finally passed
both the Senate and the House in 1976. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-49 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5660-62.
17 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (1982). Section 102 goes on to provide that "works of authorship" in-
clude the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomines and choreographic works;
(5) pictoral, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
This list is "illustrative rather than exhaustive." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 53. It "sets
out the general area of copyrightable subject matter, but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts
from rigid or outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories." Id. See also National Confer-
ence of Bar Examiners v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 692
F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983).
18 H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 51 ("This standard does not include requirements of
novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright
protection to require them.").
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allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present con-
gressional intent." 19 It also did not intend to make the subject matter
unlimited or to leave new forms of expression within that general area of
subject matter unprotected. 20
Section 103 of the Copyright Act defines a copyrightable compila-
tion as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship." 21 The legislative history of the 1976 Act makes it clear that
the basic criteria of copyrightable subject matter, including original au-
thorship, apply with equal force to works containing preexisting material
and those that are purely original.22 Protection extends, however, only
to the original contribution of the compiler or arranger, not to any pre-
existing facts or data.23
Like the constitutional provision, the Act thus provides guidance for
defining originality only in very general terms. Courts are left to develop
a federal common law to recognize and protect original works of author-
ship.24 That common law has had substantial development.
II. Judicial Formulations of Originality
While neither the Constitution nor the copyright acts prior to 1976
expressly required originality, the courts inferred such a requirement
from the language granting protection to "authors." Since an author
means beginner, first mover, creator, or originator, 25 the Constitution
necessarily requires originality, and if it is lacking, the work is not one of
an author.26 As Judge Learned Hand stated, the copyright clause's
"grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then known
but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter." 27 The Supreme
Court also has used language implying the notion of originality in the
copyright clause by pointing out that the framers of the Constitution un-
derstood that "the nature of copyright and the objects to which it was
commonly applied, for copyright, as the exclusive right of a man to the
production of his own genius or intellect, existed in England at that time
"28
19 Id.
20 Id. See also NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.03[A].
21 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The term "compilations" includes "collective work" defined as "a
work such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions,
constituting separate and independent works in themselves are assembled into a collective whole."
Id. See also NIMMER, supra note 4, § 3.02.
22 H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 16, at 57.
23 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). See also American Code Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 834 (2d Cir.
1922) (when one takes material from the public domain, and adds new material to it, and publishes
the whole, the copyright is valid only as to the "new and original" material).
24 See L. PATrERSON, supra note 13, at 220.
25 See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884); supra note 4.
26 See NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01.
27 Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (emphasis added).
28 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added).
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In the end, the cases leave no doubt that the pervading prerequisite
to copyright protection, regardless of the type of work, is originality.29
Those cases must be examined to move beyond this general standard to
an applicable one and to determine whether a threshold exists below
which originality cannot be found.
Justice Holmes' opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 3 0 is
an appropriate starting place to determine how the courts have con-
strued originality. In finding some crude lettering and portraits of per-
formers in a circus advertisement copyrightable, Holmes gave a classic
portrayal of what he considered the minimum level of expression a copy-
right ought to protect. He found that minimum level in personality--a
medium necessarily containing something unique.3 1 "It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it
something irreducible, which is one man's alone."3 2 That something is
copyrightable.33 While this description of originality brings the concept
down to a minimal level,3 4 Holmes seems to have rested his opinion of
originality on the idea that the author's personality is its key. In doing so
he may have identified a practical truth; pure originality can only ema-
nate from within a person, outside stimulus is unoriginal by definition.3 5
This concept of personality has been overlooked in the factual works
decisions.3 6
Holmes' position built upon an early Supreme Court interpretation
of originality. In United States v. Steffens 3 7 the Court, concluding that the
Trade-Mark Act was unconstitutional, found that trademarks resulted
from periods of use rather than from spontaneous creativity or design.38
Because the copyright clause protects writings, "only such as are original,
and are founded in creative powers of the mind,... the fruits of intellectual
labor,"'3 9 the trademarks did not meet the originality requirement. The
29 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 489-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857
(1976); NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01.
30 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
31 Id. at 250.
32 Id.
33 Id. The basic rationale of Holmes' opinion is that any minimal expression of originality will
suffice once that originality is found. He articulated the concern that led him to this conclusion:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and
most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appre-
ciation .... At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a
public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of the public, they
have a commercial value.., and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
Id. at 251-52.
34 See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01[B] (the Bleistein doctrine provides that any "distinguish-
able variation" from a prior work is sufficient originality for copyright protection "if such variation is
the product of the author's independent efforts, and is more than merely trivial"). See also Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
35 The dictionary definition of originality supports the idea: "relating to or constituting an ori-
gin or beginning.., not secondary, derivative, or imitative... independent and creative in thought
or action"; "the power of independent thought or constructive imagination." WEaSTER's NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 803 (1979).
36 See infra notes 59-105 and accompanying text.
37 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
38 Id. at 94.
39 Id. (emphasis in original).
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Court found that first appropriation rather than original intellectual la-
bor creates the right to use a trademark, requiring "no fancy or imagina-
tion, no genius, no laborious thought."'40 In Steffens, as in Bleistein, a key
criterion to originality is the personality or creative thoughts emanating
from an individual. While the symbol was unique as used, it arose merely
by practical use-marking the product for sale-and not from original
creativity.
Originality does not call for novelty, but rather only independent
creation. 41 As the Supreme Court stated in Baker v. Seldon,42 the "novelty
of the art or thing described or explained has nothing to do with the
validity of the copyright." 43 A work must originate with an author, mean-
ing a person must independently create it.4 4 Material in the public do-
main will support a copyright if put together as a "distinguishable" or
"substantial" variation of preexisting material.45 Put another way, "[a]ll
that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is that the
'author' contributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation,
something recognizably 'his own."' 4 6 Originality in this context means
not much more than a prohibition of copying.47 This formulation gives
the test of originality sufficient for copyright protection the appearance
of having a low threshold. But while the quantum of originality seems
modest, that quantum cannot be abandoned. 48 Indeed, courts have con-
strued the requirement that a variation on preexisting material contain
more than merely trivial changes to mean that the variation-or original-
ity-involved in a work must be substantial. 49 The foundation cases
40 Id.
41 See NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01[A].
42 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
43 Id. at 102.
44 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970); Wihtol v. Wells, 231
F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1956); Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102; Merritt Forbes & Co. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc.,
604 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Leeds Music, Ltd. v. Robin, 358 F. Supp. 650 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
See NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01[A].
45 Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927).
46 Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103 (citing Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir.
1945)).
47 Id. at 103; Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (D.C.N.Y. 1929).
Judge Learned Hand provided a classic explanation of originality as distinguished from novelty:
[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose a new Keats' Ode on a
Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author', and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that
poem, though they might of course copy Keats'.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
See also Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 103 ("the 'author' is entitled to a copyright if he independently con-
trived a work completely identical with what went before; similarly, although he obtains a valid copy-
right, he has no right to prevent another from publishing a work identical with his, if not copied from
his"). Cf Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1985).
48 See, e.g., L. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490. See also Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513
(2d Cir. 1945) (to be protected the work must "contain some substantial, not merely trivial
originality").
49 See L. Batlin, 536 F.2d at 490. See also Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir.
1983) (derivative work of art "must be substantially different from the underlying work to be copy-
rightable"); Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971) ("something more than merely refraining from outright copying is re-
quired before a new variation on an old work has sufficient originality to be copyrightable"). Profes-
sor Denicola finds that it is possible to interpret such results "as establishing the necessity for at least
some minimal degree of creativity as a prerequisite to copyright protection." Denicola, supra note 3,
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make it clear that originality is found in the creative powers of the mind;
it is the fruit of intellectual labor. To determine the copyrightability of
contributions to preexisting factual material, courts often overlook this
creative foundation, and focus instead on the labor portion of the pro-
cess rather than the original fruits of such labor.
III. Factual Compilations
A. Originality
Section 103 of the Copyright Act recognizes protection for compila-
tions of noncopyrightable material. 50 The basic approach to copyright
protection of such compilations finds originality in the arrangement or
combination put together by the compiler. When the contribution is the
arrangement of facts, courts grant copyright protection to the arrange-
ment provided that the work bears the requisite originality.51 The prod-
uct must reflect the thought of the compiler and the form must result
from the distinctive individuality of the compiler's mind.52 Indeed, the
compiler must be capable of being defined as "author", i.e., originator.53
The difference between a copyrightable compilation and an unprotected
gathering of facts is that with authorship, "the product has some likeness
to the mind underneath it; in a work of mere notation, the mind is a
guide only to the fingers that make the notation. '54
For example, the Fifth Circuit found a conditional sales contract or
chattel mortgage agreement pieced together from various legal rules and
forms uncopyrightable because it contained "nothing of substance which
resulted from [the compiler's] creative work." 55 Although the compiler
used time and effort to produce the contract, he essentially put all the
material into a commonly used order, and the court found no original
thought which resulted in a significant addition to the standard con-
tract. 56 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit found a compilation of choice
restaurants in a guide copyrightable because the compiler was an author
who started from scratch, and did his own collecting, appraising, writing,
at 522. But he sees a danger in so subjective a standard and suggests that "[o]ne must ask whether
the work reflects sufficient intellectual effort to justify copyright, or whether, instead, the quantum of
authorship is too small to merit notice," thus avoiding use of the concept of creativity. Id. See Patry,
supra note 3, at 19 (citing Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d at 102-03) (despite coupling the terms "creative" and
"original" in some decisions, case law firmly establishes that the requirment of originality does not
refer to a desired modicum of artistic merit, but rather to the consideration that the work has been
"independently produced").
50 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
51 The fact that the component parts of a collective work are not original does not prevent a
finding of originality in the combination. See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384,
388 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing NiMMER, supra note 4, §§ 3.02, 3.03).
52 National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 298 (7th Cir. 1902).
53 See supra note 4.
54 National TeL News Co., 119 F. at 298 (a compilation of news facts presented over a ticker tape
held not copyrightable).
55 Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 992 (1971).
56 Id. at 1029-30.
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and editing. 57 The compiler not only collected data, but also engaged in
creative thought to appraise, describe, and edit the work.
A problem arises when, in cases such as this, the court also looks to
the amount of labor involved in the compilation to find originality rather
than only to the creative merit of the fruits of that labor.58 These courts
tend to protect factual data despite its complete lack of originality. This
result has led to confusion over the extent that labor alone can produce
copyright protection. Some courts protect industry as an original work
of authorship, rather than only the product of such industry when it is
original.
B. The Industrious Collection Doctrine
The industrious collection doctrine can be traced back to Jeweler's
Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co.,59 where the Second Circuit
upheld the copyright granted to a book containing a compilation of
trademark illustrations that were themselves not original or copyright-
able. The court stated that where labor is expended, the right to copy-
right a book does not depend on whether the collected materials consist
of matters which show literary skill or originality, "either in thought or in
language, or anything more than industrious collection." 60 According to
the court, by going through the streets of a town and collecting the
names of the inhabitants, their occupations and street numbers, a person
acquires material for which he is the author. The labor produces a meri-
torious composition which the author may obtain the exclusive right to
publish.6 1
While the court used the term "author," the book contained a no-
ticeable lack of original thought or creativity. The mechanical process of
collecting the factual information was original, but the product itself took
no insight to produce and evidenced no original form. The concept of
originality as a prerequisite for copyright protection was seemingly di-
minished. A new emphasis was put on labor rather than on creative
processes emanating from a person.
The doctrine was seized upon in later opinions as courts struggled
with the fact that a compiler could make a substantial contribution of
labor in collecting factual data, only to have someone else freely reap the
benefit of such a collection in their similar work.62 Originality was thus
found in the process of collection, in the effort and skill of the com-'
57 Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir. 1942).
See also Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. Ill.), aft'd, 505 F.2d 1250 (7th
Cir. 1974) (a calendar arrangement was found copyrightable because the arrangement was unique
and its style, layout, and special features were completely different from any other similar product).
58 See, e.g., NiMMER, supra note 4, § 2.01[A] ("It is not any skill, training, knowledge and judge-
ment that will support a copyright, but only those qualities when exercised as acts of authorship.").
59 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
60 Id. at 88.
61 Id.
62 Professor Denicola argues that:
The effort of authorship can be effectively encouraged and rewarded only by linking the
existence and extent of protection to the total labor of production. To focus on the superfi-
cial form of the final product to the exclusion of the effort expended in collecting the data
presented in the work is to ignore the central contribution of the compiler.
[Vol. 62:763
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piler.63 A more recent example of the doctrine at work is Schroeder v.
William Morrow & Co.,6 where the Seventh Circuit found a compilation
of names and addresses in a garden directory copyrightable. The court,
citingJeweler's Circular, concluded that "only industrious collection... is
required... [and] copyright protects not the individual names and ad-
dresses but the compilation, the product of the compiler's industry." 65
The court did not seem concerned with originality; the names and ad-
dresses were arranged alphabetically, requiring no original insight on the
part of the compiler. It gave protection to the results of substantial and
independent effort,66 rather than to the fruits of original intellect.
Subsequent to Schroeder some confusion has emerged in the Seventh
Circuit as to whether it was abandoning the industrious collection doc-
trine as a basis for copyright protection. In Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet
Management Systems, Inc. 67 (Rand McNally I), the District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois found that Rand McNally's roadway mileage
guide had not been proven copyrightable as a compilation work.68 In de-
nying each parties' motion for summary judgment, the court stated that
factual compilations may be protected by copyright "if a result of some
level of compiler effort and industry." 69 In Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet
Management Systems, Inc. 70 (Rand McNally II), the district court granted
part of Rand McNally's renewed motion for summary judgment finding
that mileage table data, and certain mileage segment data contained on
maps in the guide but not in the mileage tables, were copyrightable. 7 1
Denicola, supra note 3, at 530. This argument fils to consider that a work that does not meet the
originality threshold is not entitled to protection regardless of how much labor was imputed. The
value of that labor can be protected by market forces because people will expend labor only on what
others will purchase. The law can thus foster efficiency by not granting unwarranted monopolies.
See Patry, supra note 3, at 27. Justice Brennan reinforced this point in his dissent in Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting):
It is the labor of collecting, sifting, organizing, and reflecting that predominates in the crea-
tion of works of history such as this one. The value this labor produces lies primarily in the
information and ideas revealed and not in the particular collocation of words through which
the information and ideas are expressed. Copyright thus does not protect that which is
often the most value in a work of history, and courts must resist the tendency to reject the
fair use defense on the basis of their feeling that an author of history has been deprived of
the fidl value of his or her labor.
63 See, e.g., Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (2d Cir. 1903); Den-
icola, supra note 3, at 530. See also Gorman, supra note 3, at 1570 ("What the copyright monopoly
here protects is not a product whose social value is its mark of personality or individuality, but the
effort, time, expense, and, in certain cases, the skill employed in performing a task which does not
require special intellectual competence.").
64 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
65 Id. at 5.
66 Id. at 6. While the court stated that eopyright proietted the selection, ordering, and arrange-
ment of the data, the arrangement was alphabetical and thus not original.
67 591 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. IlM. 1983).
68 Rand McNally alleged that the defendant infringe on the copyright it held for its mileage
guides. Since the court did not find that Rand McNally held a valid copyright for its mileage data, it
did not reach the issue of whether the defendant was licensed to use some of the mileage data. Id. at
734 n.7.
69 Id. at 733 ("It may be that Rand McNally's efforts with respect to the latter component [mile-
age tables] of the Mileage Guide were small, not reaching the level of'industrious collection' required
for protection.").
70 600 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
71 Id. at 934-35, 946.
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Soon after, holding the arrangement of plots on a map copyright-
able, the Seventh Circuit in Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Service
Company of Colorado, Inc.72 declared that the "copyright laws protect the
work, not the amount of effort expended. ' 73 Directory Service, relying
on Schroeder, argued that since Rockford Map spent little time preparing
the maps, its efforts were "not very 'industrious"' and its product was
thus not copyrightable.74 The court, rejecting this argument, empha-
sized that the amount of time inputted is irrelevant to copyright protec-
tion. 75 After all, a Bach cantata, a chapter of Dickens, products of a few
hours, or even the Laffer Curve, a graph illustrating an economic princi-
ple scribbled on a napkin in a few minutes, are all copyrightable. 76 While
seeming to reject industrious collection as a basis for protection, the
court actually made no explicit judgement on whether industry or labor,
in and of themselves, could be protected as original work. Rather, it in-
terpreted the decisions inJeweler's Circular and Schroeder as depending on
whether the compiler produced a "new" or original arrangement or
presentation of facts-whether the author added something of himself-
and not on the amount of time the work consumed. 77 Nevertheless, the
court's language on the irrelevancy of time or labor input created confu-
sion in the circuit. 78
The industrious collection doctrine was in full force after Rand Mc-
Nally I and 1I. In Rockford Map, however, the Seventh Circuit deem-
phasized labor and found originality only in creative arrangement. On a
motion for reconsideration, the Illinois district court was forced to recon-
sider its ealier holdings in Rand McNally I and II in light of Rockford Map.
In Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Systems, Inc. 79 (Rand Mc-
Nally III), the defendant argued that the district court judge erroneously
relied on "industrious effort" in Rand McNally I and 11 as the most impor-
tant factor to determine the copyrightability of Rand's mileage tables and
segment data and improperly extended copyright protection to the un-
derlying facts themselves.80 Judge Getzendanner admitted that she re-
lied on a labor theory of copyright protection in the earlier
proceedings.81 She stated that under Rockford Map, the district court's
assumption that the level of effort involved in a compiling the data is the
most important question, which put an extra burden on Rand McNally to
72 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 806 (1986).




77 Id. The court found that the work was "a new arrangement of facts." Id. at 149. "New" is
assumed to mean "original."
78 It remains unclear whether the Rockford Map court actually doubted the validity of the indus-
trious collection doctrine.
79 634 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. IMI. 1986). The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the court'sJuly
1984 motion for summary judgement, 600 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Rand McNally II), which the
court granted in part and denied in part. Rand McNally III, 634 F. Supp. at 604. The defendant
argued that Rockford Map rendered the court's analysis in Rand McNally I and 11 incorrect. Id. at 605.
80 Id. at 605.
81 Id. at 606.
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show industriousness, was unnecessary.8 2 Rather, the court should have
questioned whether the compilation as a whole was a copyrightable ar-
rangement "without reference to the amount of labor involved on Rand
McNally's part."8
She then denied the motion to reconsider, finding the guides copy-
rightable under Rockford Map because the collection of numerous maps
and the arrangement of data involved a "new arrangement or presenta-
tion of facts." 84 While the court did not expressly reject the industrious
collection doctrine, it seemed to rely on the originality of the work pro-
duced as the basic test of copyrightability. It still concluded, however,
that Schroeder85 remains good law in the Seventh Circuit.8 6 The court dis-
agreed that in Rockford Map, by using the term "arrangement," it was
moving away from concentrating on industriousness of the efforts to de-
velop information to concentrating on the originality of the selection or
arrangement.8 7
A later district court case in the Seventh Circuit expressly denied
that Rockford Map overruled the industrious collection doctrine, and
found instead that it affirmed the doctrine's viability. In Clark Equipment
Co. v. Lift Parts Manufacturing Co., 88 the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois denied an alleged infringer's motion for partial sum-
maryjudgment, finding a catalog of Clark's inventory copyrightable. Lift
Parts wanted a previous denial overturned in light of the new authority of
Rockford Map and Rand McNally III, which it found to have implicitly re-
jected industrious collection as a basis for protection.89
While Lift Parts characterized Clark's catalog as similar to a mere
"list of ingredients,"90 the court appeared unconcerned about the lack of
originality in the catalog. Instead, it found that the Copyright Act ex-
pressly protects compilations and "this circuit recognizes and protects
such industrious collections as well." 9' 1 It ignored the fact that the Act
also expressly requires that such a compilation constitute an original
work of authorship.9 2 While the court found that Clark's work was "an
original compilation and correlation" of illustrations, names, and num-
bers,93 it never examined whether the compiler of the catalog engaged in
82 Id.
83 Id. at 606-07.
84 Id. at 607. The court denied defendant's motion to reconsider but indicated that it was with-
out prejudice to a motion that certain uses of Rand McNally's mileage data did not constitute copy-
right infringement based on its opinion. Id. at 608.
85 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
86 Rand McNally III, 634 F. Supp. at 608.
87 Id.
88 32 Copyright. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,528 (N.D. 11. 1986).
89 Id. 20,530.
90 Id. 20,531. "[Mjere listing of ingredients or contents" are excluded from copyright protec-
tion. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (1986).
91 32 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 20,531. The court essentially agreed with Rand McNally III,
holding that industrious collection remains valid in the circuit, while not making the move toward
originality that the earlier court had implicitly made. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Parry, supra note 3, at 31 (by protecting the mere collection, assembling, selection,
coordination and arrangement of such material, the Rand McNally I court "directly contravened" the
Copyright Act and the Constitution).
93 32 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 20,531.
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original thought, rather than in a mere logical and mechanical process.
Relying completely on industrious collection as a basis for protecting the
catalog, the court overlooked the fundamental principle that copyright
protection extends only to works of an author who is an original and
creative thinker.
While purporting to rely on the basic concept of originality as a pre-
requisite for copyright protection, the Eighth Circuit in West Publishing Co.
v. Mead Data Central, Inc. ,94 actually based its finding of originality on the
amount of industry put into an arrangement. The case is an example of
how protection based upon industrious collection can go too far in creat-
ing a copyright monopoly for factual, public domain material. It in-
volved Mead's proposed citation of page numbers from West's legal
reporters in its computerized LEXIS reports of the same opinions, thus
providing "jump" or "pinpoint" citations to the location in the West re-
porter of the particular portion of an opinion viewed on LEXIS.95 In
response to Mead's announcement of its plans to add such jump cites to
its program, West Publishing brought suit claiming copyright infringe-
ment of its arrangement of case reports. 96 The court upheld a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting Mead's use of the page numbers. It affirmed
the district court's finding of a "substantial likelihood that West's ar-
rangements of case reports are protected by copyright law."'97
The court first correctly pointed out that an arrangement of preex-
isting materials may receive copyright protection, noting that "in each
case the arrangement must be evaluated in light of the originality and
intellectual-creation standards" of prior case law. 98 These standards
seemed lost, however, when the court examined West's arrangement to
see if they were met. Essentially, the cases in West's volumes are ar-
ranged in a mechanical order that took no original insight or creativity to
formulate.9 9 The court found that the arrangement resulted from "con-
siderable labor, talent, and judgment,"' 00 but did not dwell on the stan-
dard of independent creation reflecting the mind of the "author" or even
on originality itself. Rather, it was unable to move beyond labor. In re-
94 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987).
95 Id. at 1222.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1225. The court cited Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973), where the
Supreme Court stated that an original work of authorship is the product of some "creative intellec-
tual or aesthetic labor." 799 F.2d at 1223.
99 The court described West's process:
West separates the decisions of state courts from federal court decisions.... State court
decisions are divided by geographic region and assigned to West's corresponding regional
reporter. Federal decisions are first divided by the level of court they come from .... (then]
subdivided according to subject matter .... [and finally] assigned to a volume of the re-
porter and... arranged within the volume.., for example... according to circuit [in
numerical order].
799 F.2d at 1226.
100 Id. The court stated that to meet intellectua-creation requirements "a work need only be the
product of a modicum of intellectual labor," and it found that West's case arrangements easily met
this test. Id. at 1227. The court also found no allegation that West copies its case arrangement from




sponse to Mead's argument that in essence the court was giving page
numbers copyright protection, the court concluded that "protection for
the numbers is not sought for their own sake. It is sought, rather, be-
cause access to these particular numbers ... would give users of LEXIS a
large part of what West has spent so much labor and industry in compil-
ing. . . ."10 In the end, the court found that the arrangement consti-
tuted an original work of authorship, 10 2 but overlooked the inherent lack
of originality in the arrangement and page numbers.'0 3
West Publishing and the Seventh Circuit cases preceding it reflect the
extent to which protection of the labor involved in compiling or arrang-
ing noncopyrightable factual material confuses and obscures the funda-
mental originality that copyright law was designed to protect. Originality
comes from within the mind of the author or creator.'0 4 It is difficult to
see how the scope of the Copyright Act can protect a case arrangement
"which may, on the facts, be no more than the sequential publication of
court opinions in the chronological order in which the cases are handed
down." 0 5
IV. Requiring a Minimum Level of Originality as a Prerequisite for
Copyright Protection of Factual Compilations
Admittedly, the line between "intellectual labor" producing original
fruits evidencing a new creation and mere mechanical labor producing a
collection of material having little or no connection to original thought
or insight can be a fine line to draw. But the basic problem with the
industrious collection doctrine is that in attempting to protect the indus-
triousness of a compiler or arranger of facts, courts relying on the doc-
trine fail to apply the concept of originality as it is understood in
copyright law. 10 6 Courts rejecting the validity of the industrious collec-
101 Id. at 1227.
102 Id.
103 This holding seems somewhat contrary to an earlier Eighth Circuit case where the court found
that a random numbering system was unoriginal. In Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208
(8th Cir. 1986), the court stated that because the "expression itself is nothing more than public
domain numbers" it does not meet even a low threshold of originality. Id. at 1213. Rather, the
system constituted "the accidental marriage of a part and a number" and not an original work of
authorship. Id. Foreshadowing West Publishing, however, the court added that if some meaningful
pattern or judgement in the assignment of numbers could be discerned the system would be an
original work. Id. The fact remains that even with some distinguishable effort, a compilation of
numbers does not meet the creative authorship requirement.
104 See supra notes 10-49 and accompanying text.
105 787 F.2d at 1248 (Oliver, J., dissenting). Judge Oliver also does not believe that "the scope of
West's copyright is broad enough to protect the placement of arabic numbers on the pages of the
volumes in which those opinions are published." Id. Two other cases expressly deny copyright
protection to the pagination of a public domain work. Eggers v. Sun Sales Corp., 263 F. 373 (2d Cir.
1920); Banks Law Publishing Co. v. Lawyers' Co-op. Publishing Co., 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909),
appeal dismissed, 233 U.S. 738 (1911).
106 See, e.g., NiMMER, supra note 4, § 3.04. Speaking specifically of a researcher, he points out
that:
One who explores obscure archives and who finds and brings to the light of public knowl-
edge little known facts or other public domain materials has undoubtedly performed a so-
cially useful service, but such service in itself does not render the finder an "author."
Id. The person who puts together facts in the order found or some other order not requiring creative
thought also remains outside the definition of author.
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tion doctrine have come closer to succeeding in drawing the line between
intellectual labor and mechanical labor while remaining faithful to the
fundamental principles upon which copyright law was built.
Even some of the early Supreme Court cases formulating those prin-
ciples reflect a rejection of the industrious collection doctrine. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court's opinion in Baker v. Seldon, 10 7 where the
Court denied copyright protection to a book providing an arrangement
and explanation of a bookkeeping system, implicitly rejects the doctrine.
The Court stated that the plaintiffs deserved great praise for their indus-
try and enterprise in publishing the paper, but the law does not contem-
plate rewarding them for that. After all, "[t]he title of the Act of
Congress is, 'for the encouragement of learning,' and was not intended
for the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with learning and
the sciences."' 0 8 In addition, United States v. Steffens indicates that while a
form of expression may arise by mere practical necessity, the expression
must derive from creative intellect, an original thought from a unique
mind, in order to meet the minimum level of originality necessary for
copyright protection. 10 9 Such cases, while not factual compilation cases,
make it clear that labor alone does not create a copyrightable work.
A minimum threshold of originality, with an emphasis on minimum,
seems to have been established by those courts rejecting or criticizing the
industrious collection doctrine. Facts compiled, but not put together in a
subjective arrangement evidencing thoughtful selection or creativity, fall
outside the scope -of copyright protection. Without such an arrange-
ment-a completed work of authorship-a grant of copyright protects
facts themselves, preexisting information that was never intended to re-
ceive such protection.
In Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. ,110 the Fifth Circuit explicitly
rejected the industrious collection doctrine, finding research, a form of
factual compiling, not copyrightable. A lower court found that copyright
law protects not only the ingenuity involved in giving expression to facts,
but also the effort involved in discovering and exposing facts."' Com-
paring the collection of facts to the compilation of names and addresses
in a directory, the circuit court concluded that copyrightability for such a
work rests "on the originality of the selection and arrangement of the
factual material, rather than on the industriousness of the efforts to de-
velop the information."' 12 Protecting the industry involved in gathering
107 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
108 Id. at 105. In his book, Professor Kaplan summarized the dilemma reflected in the Baker
opinion and its resolution:
It is pointed out that the man who originated a workable system for producing and market- •
ing paperbacks was more deserving than the authors or publishers of many sorry books put
out in paperback which rest comfortably in copyright. Considering, however, the difficul-
ties in demarking the limits of such copyrights of methods and the pervasive intrusion on
competition which would be threatened, I daresay most of us would prefer to stay with the
Baker case.
B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 64 (1967).
109 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
110 650 F.2d 1365 (5th Cir. 1985).
111 Id. at 1369.
112 Id.
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facts or other noncopyrightable material essentially provides copyright
protection to that material itself in violation of a fundamental principle of
copyright law.' 3
Likewise, the Second Circuit finds no merit in the contention that
the labor involved in compiling factual material leads to copyright pro-
tection. In Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 114 the court gave copyright protec-
tion to a compilation of baseball cards in a guide. It ignored the industry
involved in such a collection, and instead, rested its holding squarely on
the "selection, creativity, and judgement" reflected in the list of cards. 115
While the Second Circuit finds a "surface illogic" in the proposition that
facts alone are not copyrightable while a collection of them is," 6 it solves
the dilemma by protecting only the product of original selection or crea-
tive arrangement-an original work of authorship, rather than facts
themselves.
While courts may recognize that originality in general is required in
order to protect factual compilations, they must not ignore the require-
ment that at least a minimum level of originality is necessary to support
such protection. In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Associated Tele-
phone Directory Publishers,117 the Eleventh Circuit held a telephone direc-
tory copyrightable without resort to the industrious collection doctrine,
but in doing so it misinterpreted the originality standard. The court
found that the "Atlanta Yellow Pages" was copyrightable as an original
work of authorship because it is the product of subjective selection, organi-
zation, and arrangement of preexisting materials. 118 The copyright was
not valid due to the labor involved in compiling the directory; the court
cited with approval cases discounting the substantial line of cases begin-
ning withJeweler's Circular 11 that protect the results of industrious collec-
tion rather than the product of original thought and judgement. 120 The
court, however, manipulated the originality requirement in reaching this
result. While a compilation of names and numbers in alphabetical order
reflects considerable effort, it is not a reflection of the compiler's person-
ality. This selection of material may have been subjective, but it did not
rise to the minimum level of original thought necessary for copyright
protection.
If an arrangement can pass the original work of authorship thresh-
old, then courts can grant copyright protection on legitimate grounds
faithful to copyright principles. It is when the prerequisites to this origi-
113 Id. at 1372.
114 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
115 Id. at 863.
116 Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv. Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 507 (2d Cir. 1984).
See also id. at 510 (Newman, J., concurring):
The fact that some language in early cases [citingJeweler's Circular] and, perhaps, even some
results reached in those cases ... have supported a view that copyright protection should be
extended solely because of laborious effort is no reason for us to disregard the statutory
criteria that Congress articulated in 1976 when it enacted the current statute. The "sweat
of the brow" rationale is no substitute for meeting one of those statutory criteria.
117 756 F.2d 801 (lth Cir. 1985).
118 Id. at 809-10 (emphasis added).
119 See supra note 59.
120 756 F.2d at 809.
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nality standard are found lacking that courts grasp to find a basis for pro-
tection in industry. While the industrious collection approach seems fair
in view of the large amount of time and effort a compiler may contribute
to a work, the concern for free dissemination of information to the public
should outweigh the need for such protection. A compiler not meeting
the originality threshold can find protection in the marketplace. The
public will purchase the most useful and economical presentation of
information.
V. Conclusion
Copyright law is intended to protect only original works of author-
ship. Originality at a minimum involves independent creation. While it
is difficult to define when a compiler contributes enough original expres-
sion to a collection of noncopyrightable data so that the compiler be-
comes an "author," a minimum threshold of originality is necessary to
prevent courts from granting protection to unoriginal works, thus limit-
ing distribution of the underlying information. That threshold of origi-
nality can be found in reflections of the author's personality. Whether it
is in a novel or an arrangement of preexisting facts, copyright essentially
protects original expression from the mind of the author.
Finding copyrightability to turn upon the amount of labor expended
in assembling data inappropriately protects facts themselves when such
industrious collection is merely mechanical rather than intellectual. To
determine whether a compilation of facts is copyrightable, courts should
look exclusively at the arrangement of material and determine whether it
is a new work of independent creation. Since the fundamental concept of
originality views it as a reflection of personality, this approach is consis-
tent with the purpose and scope of copyright law.
Elizabeth M. Saunders
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